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Source text - Slovenian Izvedbeni model trajnostnega krmiljenja emisij CO2 (obsega cestnega prometa) s tržnimi dovolilnicami za cestna motorna vozila na primeru Slovenije
Izbrani vidiki obravnave poglavja
Na osnovi spoznanj predstavljenih v prejšnjih poglavjih bomo v tem poglavju razvili predlog modela za trajnostno krmiljenje emisij CO2 (obsega) cestnega prometa v Sloveniji.
Ob upoštevanju hipotetično globalno zahtevanih količinskih omejitev emisij CO2, ki smo jih predstavili v globalnem modelu krmiljenja emisij CO2, bomo na osnovi konkretnih podatkov cestnega prometa v Sloveniji (državna raven) za leto 2005 izračunali (cenovne in dohodkovne) posledice, ki bi prizadele različne sodelujoče družbene podsisteme, če bi količino emisij (porabljenega pogonskega goriva) zmanjšali za različne ciljne vrednosti.
Da bi lahko z zadostno in potrebno celovitostjo izvedli zastavljeno nalogo, bomo poglavje vsebinsko razdelili na naslednje, med seboj vsebinsko povezane, sklope:
osnovni (izvedbeni) model za trajnostno krmiljenje emisij CO2 cestnega prometa s tržnimi dovolilnicami za nakup goriva v Sloveniji, ki bo predstavil vse bistvene elemente, potrebne za uvedbo modela. For Za dokončno izvedbo modela potrebujemo še delne rešitve, ki jih bomo izvedli v naslednjih podpoglavjih:
izračun tržnih cene dovolilnic. Hipotetično ceno tržnih dovolilnic, pri različni stopnji omejitev, bomo izračunali na osnovi teoretičnih in izkustvenih spoznanj svetovne strokovne literature iz obravnavanega področja
statični model za količinsko, cenovno in finančno vrednotenje posledic uvedbe tržnih dovolilnic v cestni promet Slovenije in
predstavitev izračunanih kvantitativnih parametrov (podrobnejši izračun v prilogah 1 in 2)
Translation - English IMPLEMENTING MODEL FOR SUSTAINABLY CONTROLLING CO2 EMISSIONS (ROAD TRAFFIC VOLUME) BY MEANS OF TRADEABLE PERMITS FOR ROAD MOTOR VEHICLES IN THE CASE OF SLOVENIA
Selected approach to chapter organisation
We will develop this proposed model for sustainable CO2 emissions reductions (volume) in road transport in Slovenia. using the presentation familiar from previous chapters
Besides hypothetical respect for global reductions in the volume of CO2 emissions, which we presented in the global CO2 emissions control model, we will use concrete figures for road traffic in Slovenia in 2005 to calculate the effects (in price and revenue) on different participating subsystems of society if the volume of emissions (transport fuel consumption) were to be reduced by selected target amounts .
In order to accomplish the task we have been set with the necessary and desirable thoroughness, we will divide the content of this chapter into the following interrelated sections:
basic (implemented) model for sustainable control of road traffic CO2 emissions by means of tradable permits for the purchase of fuel in Slovenia, which will present all significant factors required to implement the model. For final implementation of the model we would still require partial solutions, which we will present in the following sub-sections
calculation of the market price of permits, at different levels of restriction, which we will calculate on the basis of theoretical and practical knowledge in published specialised literature from the field under consideration.
statistical models for volume, price and financial values resulting from the implementation of tradable permits for road use in Slovenia, and
presentation of calculated quantitative parameters (more detailed calculations in Appendices 1 and 2)
Most important novelties of this model compared with solutions previously proposed in the published literature.
The most significant novelties of the model presented compared with procedures previously proposed in literature are that:
with the aid an organisational form, i.e. a company for managing tradable permits for road traffic (presented on p. 199,) it resolves the problem which has hitherto remained unresolved in world literature : how to manage tradable permits in the road transport sector, a sector which contains an exceptionally high number of of market subjects (road vehicles) and an exceptionally high number of transactions (fuel purchases). Our approach solves the problem for all road vehicles (private cars, buses, lorry transport, motorbikes) and not just for part (as e.g. Raux 2004).
It enables the integration of trading in CO2 emissions (road) with the existing scheme for tradable CO2 emissions in the energy production field in Europe. At around 30% of total emissions, road traffic is one of the most significant and fastest growing generators of CO2 emissions in the world.
The existing solution for CO2 emissions trading with its capped quotas is incomplete because it has not got an effective control mechanism for all systems which emit CO2. Universal models should be capable of controlling emissions not only in Europe but throughout the world.
Aims of our model
To reduce the quantities of fuel sold (CO2 emissions) in 2006 compared to the end of 2005 by:
5%, 10%, 20% and 30%
the so-called “CAP” system is accepted by the competent authority in Slovenia (the Ministry for the Environment) in designing universal and national targets for CO2 emission reductions in individual sectors in the national framework.
System and criteria for initial distribution of tradable permits
Tradable permits, according to our system, would be distributed on a “free-of-charge initial distribution” basis (see description in chapter 5 on tradable permits). Such a distribution has two advantages, it is fairer to all motor vehicle owners , allowing the owner of each vehicle in any category to receive (free of charge) the same annual quota of tradable permits for the purchase of fuel (CO2 emissions). This system of initial universal distribution of tradable permits also permits the competent authority to define a reserve quota for public policy requirements, such as emergency vehicles, the army, the police, invalids, new vehicle owners, special categories of vehicle owners - e.g. those who live in outlying areas and have not the same access to public transport, etc. - without difficulty (x% of total available annual quantity). We have deliberately left this area out of our calculations as these few percentage points would not have a significant effect on the final result.
In order to avoid fluctuation in tradable allowance prices at the end of the calendar year, allowances the validity of permits would be related to the registration date of each vehicle.
Distribution of tradable permits would be based on the following vehicle categories:
private cars
goods vehicles
up to 2 tonnes
2 – 10 tonnes
above 10 tonnes
buses
motor cycles1
The initial volume on which we would base the annual amount of tradable permits for the purchase of fuel for each category of road vehicle would be the actual figures for the year 2005 for:
average annual distance driven (km),
average fuel consumption (l/100 km)2, and
Numbers of vehicles registered in each category in Slovenia
The data on the number of registered vehicles for the year 2005 was provided by the Slovenian Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Quantity of tradable permits (QTP) per type of vehicle (personal cas, HGV, LGV, buses, etc.) is calculated according to the average annual fuel consumption (AAFC) of each category of vehicle, number of vehicles in the category and an estimate (questionnaire) of average distances driven for each category of vehicle. The applicable formula is:
QTP = AAFC/100 x PLPR
5.3. Tradable Permit Units
To make it easier to understand how the system works, in our example we will make one unit of tradable allowance equal to a unit of fuel, which means, that each tradable permit unit allows the purchase of one litre of fuel. Symbolically we say
1TPU = 1 litre of fuel
Fuel consumption is directly related to the scale of CO2 emission. Expert sources3 use average values amounting to 2.27 kg CO2/l fuel for petrol and for diesel to 2.63 kg CO2 /l fuel. Diesel fuel produces 16% more CO2 per litre of fuel consumed than petrol. On the other hand, figures on average fuel consumption for vehicles registered in Slovenia4, show that diesel engines consume on average 15% less fuel than petrol engines. Therefore our model does not deal separately with harmful emissions from petrol and diesel powered vehicles.
Average quantity of CO2 emission from fuel consumption is calculated in our model on the basis of an assessment of annual fuel consumption and related values for CO2/l for all registered petrol and diesel vehicles in Slovenia, and comes to 2.42 kg CO2. In our model we therefore apply the following equation:
1 litre fuel = 2.42 kg CO2
We give the numbers of tradable permit units necessary for each category of motor vehicle in Table 1.
Table 1: Number of tradable permit units by type of vehicle in 2006
Category
Number of TPUs for 2006
Cars
1.245.518.050
Goods vehicles
360.148.797
buses
64.259.300
Motor cycles
3.894.526
Total
1.673.820.67
According to the calculations in appendix 12.2 it would have been necessary to distribute (without considering the reserves) a total of 1.673.820.673 Tradable Permit Units or authorise the sale of that many litres of fuel, if we wanted to maintain the level of consumption at the 2005 level.
In table 2 we show how the available TPUs (litres of fuel) would have been distributed by category of motor vehicle. In the same way, the table also shows the estimated reduction in quantities of fuel (TPU) at different levels ofreduction in CO2 emissions from road transport.
Table 2: Numbers of TPU per vehicle.
TDUs/ Vehicle Category
Cars
Goods vehicles
Under 2 t
2-5 t
5-10 t
Over 10 t
Tractors
Buses
Motor-cycles
Up to 150 ccm
Over 150 ccm
Equal Quantity
1.295
2.520
4.650
6.480
7.000
21.000
28.700
67
124
5 % reduction
1.230
2.394
4.418
6.156
6.650
19.950
27.265
64
118
10 % reduction
1.166
2.268
4.185
5.832
6.300
18.900
25.830
60
112
20 % reduction
1.036
2.016
3.720
5.184
5.600
16.800
22.960
54
99
30 % reduction
907
1.764
3.255
4.536
4.900
14.700
20.090
47
87
On the basis of the data presented in the table, we can conclude that in order to achieve a 10% reduction, car owners would be entitled to 1166 tradable permit units, while for a 20% reduction they would receive only 1,036 TPU's (litres of fuel). Similar conditions are applied also to all other basic categories of road vehicle.
Price of tradable permits as a function of price elasticity of demand (for transport)
Since no concrete data is available with regard to the behaviour of consumers with regard to foreseeable quantitative restrictions on fuel consumption, we will use secondary theoretical and empirical observations.
Price elasticity of demand in transport
Published literature which examines the elasticity of prices and demand in the transport field (e.g. Dix and Goodwin 1982; Goodwin 1992; Espey 1998; Oum, Waters II and Yong 1990; Oum and Waters II 2000; Mrkaić 2004; Graham and Galister 2004), differentiates between short term and long term price elasticity of demand. Goodwin, Dargay and Hanly (2004) define short term price elasticity of demand as the response of demand to changes in the price (of fuel) within one year. Long term price elasticity of demand is defined in the majority of available publications in the field of transport as elasticity which measures the response to change in price (of fuel) within a period of 5-10 years (Goodwin, Dargay and Hanley 2004, 276).
It is the view of the authors cited that consumers (or businesses) find it easier to adjust to change in the longer term than in the short term - because in the longer term they have more possible alternative responses to the change in price (Goodwin 1992, 163) thus in the long term, demand will be more elastic than in the short term . (Goodwin 1992, cited in Oum and Waters II 2000, 200).
Demand elasticity (of price and/or revenue) in transport is usually calculated for:
Individual travel;
vehicle ownership;
freight-transport services;
fuel consumption (Graham and Glaister 2004, 262) (*This line is missing from the latest text you sent me. Áine)
According to the results of most studies, the price elasticity of fuel consumption is greater than the price elasticity of driving (most frequently 1.5 – 2 times greater). Similarly, revenue elasticity is greater than price elasticity (usually 1.5 – 3 times greater) (Goodwin, Dargay and Hanly 2004, 280). Consideration of various studies carried out by Graham and Glaister (2004) also shows that in the longer term, cross elasticity between the numbers of trips and the price of fuel is reduced (probably due to increased possibilities for adjustment, because of which people make fewer journeys and those made are shorter).
It is significant that, in practice, estimates of elasticity are vary varied. This happens because they are dependent on estimated volume of demand for transport (Oum and Waters II, 2000, 209). In order to obtain a more accurate estimation of the price elasticity of demand for transport, it is necessary to make a special analysis of demand adjusted to the actual market situations which we are examining. So it is not enough just to use existing estimates of demand elasticity (this would to give rise to high costs, but the estimates would probably not reflect real market conditions) (Oum and Waters II 2000, 206).
THIS PARAGRAPH APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN REMOVED. THE CHANGES TO THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT PARAGRPAH DON'T SEEM TO AFFECT THE ENGLISH.
Numerous studies already completed indeed show that the demand for transport, which is effective demand, is usually stiff or inelastic (Oum, WatersII and Yong 1990, 10). In contrast with this, practice has shown that the value of the price-elasticity coefficient of demand for transport is greater than that assigned in the literature (due to competition between different modes, destinations and the variety of transport undertakings in the market). Demand elasticity for transport is even greater if we take account also of the long-term effects of certain changes (Oum and Waters II 2000, 209).
In most cases the big differences in estimates of the price-elasticity of demand result from:
failure to take account of competition between modes;
failure to take account of the possibility of choosing between a number of different routes leading to the desired destination, or of other problems related to the choice of route;
the use of different functions in calculations;
the use of different definitions of variables (e.g. real costs of vehicle operation and nominal operational costs);
examination of different time periods and areas (e.g. long-term/short-term elasticity, data from different countries), different levels of data collection (Oum, Waters II and Yong 1990,9)
neglecting significant variables in the demand equation (e.g. quality of transport services) (Oum and WatersII 2000, 208)
Estimating demand elasticity for fuel in studies analysed
The results of analytical studies (Harbour 1987; Mogridge 1983, cited in Goodwin 1992, 158-159) demonstrate to us that a permanent 10% increase in fuel prices will lead to:
a reduction of about 3% in the demand for fuel in the short term and
a reduction of demand for fuel equal to or greater than 7% in the longer term (Due to the use of smaller or more efficient vehicles) (Goodwin 1992, 159)
As has been mentioned, long term elasticity of demand will be (absolutely) greater than short term elasticity. Dix and Goodwin (1982) suggested that this is applicable also to price-elasticity of demand for fuel. This is due to the fact that it takes some time to change numbers of journeys, vehicle ownership or destination. However, some minor adjustments can be made in the short run (e.g. changing driving habits and speeds, avoiding less economic driving behaviour, etc.) (Goodwin 1992, 158)
In Table 10 we present the estimates of the price elasticity of demand for fuel by different authors . It should be borne in mind that most estimates made really express the average value of the results of studies made by an author in a particular environment. (e.g. Goodwin 1992 reviewed 13 studies)5
Table 3: Price elasticity of demand for fuel.
Views of results by author
Short term
Dolgoročna
- Goodwin 1992 (time series data)
- 0,27
- 0,71
- Goodwin 1992 (data from different sectors)
- 0,28
- 0,84
- Espey 1998
- 0,26
- 0,58
- Goodwin et al. 2004 (time series data)
- 0,25
- 0,64
- Goodwin et al. 2004 (static evaluation6)
- 0,43*
- Perrels 2006
- 0,2 do -0,3
- 0,4 do -0,8
- Graham in Glaister 2004
- 0,25
- 0,77
- Webster in Bly 1980 (cited in Goodwin 1992)
- 0,48**
- Mrkaić 20047
- 0,2
- 0,89
Opombi: * total value
** Unweighted average value
On the basis of an analysis of the results of various studies of the elasticity of demand for fuel (Table 10) we can conclude that:
the estimates of the different authors do not vary significantly;
Most of the studies analysed differentiate between long term and short term demand elasticity for fuel;
The average coefficient for short term elasticity is estimated at -0.3, while that for long term elasticity is -0.7.
In order to quantify the results of introducing a system of tradable permits for fuel in Slovenia we will apply the above coefficients elasticity to our further analysis.
We would like to emphasise that in our view the coefficients for the price elasticity of demand for fuel mentioned above are valid only in the case of small changes in price. If the price of fuel were to increase strongly then the price elasticity of demand for fuel would differ significantly from that mentioned above.
We base this view on the fact that a few percentage points of change (increase) in the price of fuel will not have a big influence on the structure of income employment of the average consumer or business. If, however, the price of fuel were to double, or even treble, this would have a significant effect on the structure of use of the available income of vehicle owners, who would in practice react by reducing their demand for fuel.8
Calculating (estimating) the price of tradable permits
In what follows we will calculate the price of tradable permits required to induce :
5%, 10%, 20%, and 30%
reductions in fuel sales. Particular attention should be given to price and effect where the intention is to reduce fuel sales by 20%, since this is the level of reduction which would be required to bring us back to 1980 emission levels (chapter on global requirement for emissions reductions – chapter 6).
In calculating the price of tradable permits we will apply the coefficients for demand elasticity extracted from the technical literature cited. Since world-wide publications dealing with elasticity coefficients (e.g. Goodwin 1992; Espey 1998; Graham and Glaister 2004, etc) differentiate between long and short term elasticity coefficients, we too will calculate long and short term prices for tradable permits. The elasticity coefficients which we will use are drawn from:
Goodwin 1992 (uses the most representative values for elasticity coefficients from world publications) and
Mrkaić 2004.
With regard to the elasticity coefficients practised by Mrkaiću (2004) it is important to mention that we have taken the average value of individual coefficients (for he differentiates between petrol and diesel).
The price of tradable permits represents the difference between the price which develops after restrictions are applied to fuel sales and the price which was applied prior to restrictions. Given that the average price of fuel in 20059 was 0.92 EUR10, data on the foreseeable price of tradable permits for different reduction levels are presented in Table 11.
Table 3: Short term and long term prices for tradable permits
(Some thing has happened here which I don't understand. I translated the headings in the table in the “Promet” file, then copied the table to here. The headings in English copied correctly, but the figures which it filled in were the ones in the original table in the left hand column, and attempts to re-copy are totally disastrous. Aine)
Reduction in Fuel sales
Goodwin 1992
Mrkaić 2004
Short term
Long term
Short term
Long term
5 %
0,15 EUR
0,07 EUR
0,23 EUR
0,05 EUR
10 %
0,31 EUR
0,13 EUR
0,46 EUR
0,10 EUR
20 %
0,61 EUR
0,26 EUR
0,92 EUR
0,21 EUR
30 %
0,92 EUR
0,39 EUR
1,38 EUR
0,31 EUR
From which we can conclude:
From the above table we can see that the expected price of tradable permits for fuel would rise in proportion to the reduction in fuel for sale. Thus the price at the 5% reduction level would be 0.15 EUR higher (if we apply the coefficient of elasticity determined by Goodwin) or 0.23 EUR higher (if we apply the Mrdaića elasticity coefficient), for a 20% reduction the price would increase to 0.61 EUR or 0.92 EUR (Mrkaić). A 30% reduction in quotas available for sale would bring about a short term increase in the initial price of fuel of 0.92 (Goodwin) or 1.38 EUR (Mrkaić) per litre.
*************************
(The paragraphs below appear to have been removed?
With regard to the above conclusions, it should be emphasised that we are speaking of the expected increase in the price of tradable permits. To the price of these tradable permits, as will become clear from the statistical model in the following chapter, we will have to add the basic “gross” price of a litre of fuel!
Quantities, prices and financial assets arising from the introduction of tradable permits for road transport in Slovenia (Static approach)
That a sufficiently effective system of tradable permits would make it possible to achieve the desired restriction of the parameters under consideration is undisputed. This means, that the introduction of a tradable permits system would make it possible at national, universal and sectoral levels, to achieve such current objectives as restriction of CO2 emissions.
Other positive side-effects will be achieved alongside attainment of the targets set, due to systemic co-dependencies. By means of static linear models (compare also Raux and Marolt 2004; Cramton and Kerr 1999) we can illustrate and quantify key effects on Slovenia's transport system of implementing the tradable permits system.
We should be aware that, in reality, conditions would be significantly and quantitatively different, since TPU's would lead to direct and dynamic changes in the market. Nevertheless, the statistical model can help us to illustrate the substantive market conditions prior to the introduction of tradable permits and the effects of their implementation at 5%, 10%,20% and 30% levels of reduction in the availability of transport fuel. In reality, the relationships in the case of a reduction or 10% or 30% would not be linear as one could mistakenly believe from diagram 30. Diagram 30 allows us only to illustrate the causes of the resulting links, which we will also try and quantify in our conclusions.)
**************************************
5.6 Effects of implementation of Tradable Permits
The direct effects of implementing Tradable Permits is illustrated in Table 5.
Table 5: Effects of implementing tradable permits
Reduction in volume
10%
20%
Fuel consumption reduction: volume/value
million litres
182,15
364,31
million EUR
167,03
334,07
National Budget income reduction
excise duties (million EUR)
61,97
123,93
VAT (million EUR)
27,85
55,71
Reduction of fuel trade margins
12,73
25,47
Reduction of tolls
13,94
27,88
Reduction of CO2 emissions
440,81
881,62
It is uncontested that the introduction of tradable permits would effectively reduce the targeted parameters, as for example a targeted reduction in fuel consumption, or CO2 emissions. Achievement of such goals would imply, due to systematic interrelationships corresponding effects on other related subsystems. So we can also estimate the direct effects of implementing tradable permits such as reduced cash flows to the national budget (taxes, excise duties), reduced income for fuel distributors, lower income from road tolls, etc..
5.7. Technical aspects of using tradable permits
The fuel Tradable Permits model for Slovenia based on the proposed model would work as follows:
“a fuel purchase credit card” to draw fuel from the available annual tradable permit (litres of fuel) quota. Each vehicle owner would be issued with a “credit card” representing their entitlement to purchase fuel. This card would be presented at the pumps before fuel is purchased. Fuel would flow as long as there were still entitlements in the card. When these run out there would be two possibilities:
on a terminal installed at the filling station, he can purchase additional TPU's at the current (higher) rate, or
he can acquire a chosen quota at a price fixed in advance from his agent, from his Tradable Permits portfolio manager.
Agents (companies) for the management of Tradable Permits held by those owning Tradable Permits for road traffic. This company would buy and sell Tradable Permits in the name of and for the account of road vehicle owners in the Tradable Permits Exchange and would perform a “banking function”, providing Tradable Permits at prefixed conditions. For this task they would be entitle ???? Individual agents (brokers) would manage trade in Tradable Permits for at least 300 000 vehicle owners and like a securities broker trade on behalf of his/her client, buying and selling permits on the Tradable Permits “stock exchange”. In this way competition would be created between individual brokers on the Tradable Permits Exchange, enabling trading transparency and operability for the exceptionally large number of motor vehicle owners or holdes of Tradable Permits.
5.8 Measures to prevent abuse and speculation In order to prevent possible irregularities in the Tradable Permits market we have foreseen the following precautionary measures:
Annual procurement quantities restricted for individual vehicles to theoretical highest possible fuel consumption for that category of vehicle (quarterly average of allowable quantity)
surveillance by competent authorities of use made of allowances and of the work of the management company (Tietenberg 2002, 3).
Data bank (of permit users)
Pre-determined strict penalties for non-respect of the rules governing the system.
Restriction of permits which might be harmful to the public interest (Tietenberg 2002, 11-14).
Fuel could be purchased only for registered motor vehicles.
Diagram 1: Quantitative, price and financial aspects of implementing tradable permits
Price TRADABLE PERMITS
CAP
Danish to English: Poverty in Denmark
Source text - Danish Flere havner i langvarig fattigdom
Antallet af fattige er steget markant siden 2001, og flere bliver hængende i fattigdom. Det fører til social isolation.
Der er blevet større forskel på rig og fattig i Danmark.
Over en kvart million danskere lever i dag under den økonomiske samarbejdsorganisation OECD’s fattigdomsgrænse: 250 kroner om dagen efter skat.
Det beløb skal række til både husleje, vand, varme, tøj og mad – samt hvad en hverdag i Danmark ellers kræver.
Stigende antal langtidsfattige
Fra 2001 til 2006 er antallet af fattige steget med 55.000 mennesker, viser en ny analyse fra Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd (AE), der offentliggøres i dag. Det fremgår også, at hver fjerde fattige har levet under fattigdomsgrænsen i mindst tre år.
Og det er netop det stigende antal langtidsfattige, som er bekymrende, vurderer Finn Kenneth Hansen fra Center for Alternativ Samfundsanalyse.
»Måske kan man klare sig et enkelt år i fattigdom, men ligger man der i over tre år i træk, begynder man at mærke afsavn. Så forlænger lånene sig, børnene kan ikke komme på udflugter med skolen, møblerne forfalder. Og det er der, fattigdom virkelig viser sig«, forklarer Finn Kenneth Hansen, som har forsket i fattigdom.
Ingen officiel fattigdomsgrænse
Han betegner de langtidsfattige som »de usynligt fattige«:
»De bor jo i et hus, børnene får tøj på kroppen. Men de kan ikke få sund mad, børnene kan ikke deltage i aktiviteter, og man har måske ikke råd til internet. Til sidst fører det til social isolation«.
Danmark har ingen officiel fattigdomsgrænse, men AE-Rådet har arbejdet med den definition, som Det Økonomiske Råd og OECD også bruger.
Her bestemmes grænsen for fattigdom ud fra den øvrige befolknings indtægter. I Danmark er man relativt fattig, hvis man som enlig lever for mindre end 7.500 kroner om måneden efter skat.
»Det er relativt, for de er ikke fattige i forhold til dem i Afrika. Men de har så meget mindre og færre muligheder end den gængse dansker, at det er vanskeligt for dem at leve et liv, som man lever det i Danmark«, forklarer direktøren for AE-Rådet, Lars Andersen.
Translation - English More ending in long term poverty.
The number of poor people has grown significantly since 2001, and more people are reaining in poverty. This leads to social isolation. The cleft between rich and poor in Denmark has widened.
More than a quarter of a million Danes are now living under the OECD economic cooperation organisation’s poverty line: 250 kroner/day after tax.
This sum has to be stretched to cover rent, water, heating, clothes and food - everything required for daily life in Denmark.
Increasing numbers in long-term poverty
Between 2001 and 2006, a new analysis by Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd , (AE - Labour Vocational Council) shows that the numbers of poor increased by 55,000 people,. It appears also that every fourth poor person has been living below the poverty line for at least 3 years.
And it is this aspect of the increasing proportion of long term poverty which is worrying, in the opinion of Finn Kenneth Hansen of the Centre for Alternative Social Analysis.
“It may be possible to cope with a single year of poverty, but after three consecutive years signs of want appear. Loans grow longer, children cannot go on school expeditions, furniture gets worn out. And that is when poverty becomes really apparent,” explains Finn Kenneth Hansen, who has carried out research into poverty.
No official poverty line
He calls long term poor the “invisible poor”
“Theyhave a house to live in, the children have clothes to wear. But they cannot afford healthy food, the children don’t participate in activities, they may not be able to afford the internet. In the end, this leads to social isolation.”
Denmark has no official poverty line, but the AE-Council works on the basis of a definition which is also applied by the Economic Council and the OECD .
In this, poverty is defined on the basis of the average income level. In Denmark, one is relatively poor if as a single person one lives on less than 7,500 kroner per month after tax.
“It is relative, they are not poor in comparison to people in africa. But their opportunities and possibilities are so much lower than those of the average Dane that it is difficult for them to live the kind of life that is lived in Denmark” explains Lars Andersen, director of the AE-Council
French to English: Statutes
Source text - French Statuts de l’Association Europe-Tiers Monde
Association internationale sans but lucratif
Titre 1er - Dénomination, siège social, objet
Article 1
L' "Association Europe-Tiers Monde", ci-après dénomée l'Association est une Association internationale sans but lucratif régie par les dispositions du titre III de la loi du 27 juin 1921 sur les Associations sans but lucratif, les Associations internationales sans but lucratif et les fondations.
Son siège social est établi dans l'agglomération bruxelloise et actuellement à Bruxelles 1048, rue de la Loi, 175. Le siège social de l'Association pourra être transféré partout en Belgique sur simple décision du Comité à publier aux annexes du Moniteur belge.
Elle est constituée sans limitation de durée.
Article 2
L'Association a pour but de promouvoir la compréhension et la coopération entre les ressortissants des pays européens et des pays en voie de développement.
A cette fin, elle s'est fixé notamment pour objectifs concrets:
· de sensibiliser le personnel des institutions de l'Union européenne aux problèmes du développement et aux causes de l'écart croissant entre pays industrialisés et pays du Tiers Monde, de susciter leurs réflexions et d'attirer leur attention par tous les moyens appropriés, notamment conférences, pétitions et autres manifestations;
· de créer des liens directs avec une ou plusieurs collectivités déterminées du Tiers Monde, sans distinction de race, d'appartenance confessionnelle ou d'opinions politiques, notamment par le moyen d'aides concrètes, afin de soutenir et de compléter leurs efforts propres pour assurer leur progrès.
Translation - English # Statutes (Articles of Association) of the Europe-Third World Association
Europe-Tiers Monde Association
International non-profit organisation
Title I - Name, registered office, objectives.
Article 1.
The “Association Europe-Tiers Monde” (Europe-Third World Association), hereinafter called the Association, is an international non-profit organisation governed by the provisions of title III of the Law of 27 June 1921 on Associations sans but lucratif, les associations internationales sans but lucratif et les fondations. (Non-profit organisations, international non-profit organisations and foundations).
Its registered office is established in the Greater Brussels area, and is currently at Brussels 1048, rue de la Loi, 175. The registered office of the Association can be transferred anywhere in Belgium by simple decision of the Committee to be published in the Annexes to the Moniteur Belge.
It is established for an indefinite period.
Article 2
The objective of the Association is to promote understanding and cooperation between citizens of European countries and those of developing countries.
For this purpose, it has attributed itself the following concrete objectives;
- To increase the awareness and understanding of the staff of the institutions of the European Union of development matters and of the causes of the growing gap between industrialised countries and those in the third world, to incite them to reflect on these issues and to draw their attention to them by all appropriate means, including conferences, petitions and other activities.
- To create direct links with one or more identified collectivities in the third world, without distinction of race, creed or political conviction, in order to support and supplement their own efforts to ensure progress.
German to English: EU3W History
Source text - German 1. Eine Idee wird geboren
Die Vereinigung Europa-Dritte Welt wurde in einem Umfeld errichtet, das weit vom heutigen Erscheinungsbild der europäischen Institutionen entfernt ist. Die Gründerstaaten bildeten noch keine Union, sondern waren in der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG) zusammengeschlossen. Zum 1. Juli 1968 wurden gerade erst die letzten Zölle abgeschafft; der Abbau vieler weiterer Handelshemmnisse bis hin zur heutigen Verschmelzung der Märkte lag noch ganz in der Ferne; der Gedanke an eine gemeinsame Währung war noch nicht einmal aufgetaucht. Die EWG hatte in jener Zeit nur 6 Mitgliedstaaten und arbeitete in bloß 4 Amtssprachen. EGKS und Euratom waren mit eigenen Kommissionen neben der Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft tätig. Am 1. Juli 67 kam es dann zur „Fusion der Exekutiven“, d.h. zur Einsetzung einer gemeinsamen „Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften“ mit 9 Kommissaren unter dem Vorsitz von Jean Rey, der auf Betreiben von De Gaulle den ersten Präsidenten der EWG, Walter Hallstein, ablöste. Die EWG-Kommission beschäftigte 1965 etwa 3200 Beamte in 8 Gebäuden (der Einzug der ersten Dienststellen in das alte „Berlaymont“ begann 1967); heute hat die Kommission etwa 22.000 Bedienstete in 61 Gebäuden. Die 1960er Jahre brachten den meisten Mitgliedstaaten zwar ein starkes Wirtschaftswachstum, politisch aber erstarkte Europa nicht. Einem England-Beitritt hatte De Gaulle 1963 sein Veto entgegengesetzt. Auch die Nachwehen seiner „Politik des leeren Stuhls“, mit er erzwang, dass kein Mitgliedstaat in Fragen von nationalem Interesse überstimmt werden konnte, waren trotz des Luxemburger Kompromisses von 1966 noch fühlbar. Erst De Gaulles Rücktritt nach den Mai-Unruhen von 1968 brachte wieder Bewegung in den Integrationsprozess.
1.1. Unser Vorläufer: Das Komitee für Nahrungsmittelhilfe 1961-1967
Die Entwicklungspolitik freilich nahm mit den ersten Assoziierungsabkommen von Yaoundé (1963 und 1969) schon früh einen hoffnungsfrohen Anfang, auch wenn die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in den folgenden Jahrzehnten wegen der verschiedenen Eigeninteressen der Mitgliedstaaten immer wieder in Sackgassen geriet. Für die „Entwicklung der überseeischen Staaten und Territorien“ war von 1962 bis 1970 der Kommissar Henri Rochereau zuständig, dem 1973 Claude Cheysson folgte. Es war aber der für Landwirtschaft verantwortliche niederländische Kommissar und spätere Kommissionspräsident Sicco Mansholt, der sich in eine Initiative einschaltete, die letztlich zur Gründung unserer Vereinigung führte.
Den Menschen in Europa kamen die Länder der Südhalbkugel damals hauptsächlich durch Nachrichten über Hungersnöte ins Bewusstsein; die F.A.O. rief zum Kampf gegen solche Katastrophen auf. In Belgien unterstützte vor allem OXFAM dieses Anliegen. In Kontakt mit OXFAM gründete die Personalvertretung der Europabeamten ein Komitee, in dem Mansholt wegen seiner Verbindungen zur F.A.O. den Ehrenvorsitz übernahm. Dieses Komitee organisierte von 1961 bis 1967 beim EWG-Personal 6 Spendensammlungen, deren Ertrag es nicht zur direkten Nahrungsmittelhilfe, sondern zur Verbesserung der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion einsetzte.
Translation - English 1. An idea is born
The European-Third World Association was founded in an environment which was very different from the picture presented by the European Institutions today. The Founding States did not yet form a Union, much rather they made up the European Economic Community (EEC). On July 1st 1968 the last customs duties had just been removed , the removal of non-tax barriers to trade and the merging of the markets which we know today were still far in the future, thoughts of a single currency had not even occurred to anyone. In those days the EEC had only six members and no more than 4 working languages. The ECSC and Euratom each had its own Commission working alongside that of the Economic Community. July 1st, 1967 saw the „Executive merger“ of the three Communities with the creation of a common „Commission of the European Communities“ having 9 Commissioners under the leadership of Jean Rey, who, at De Gaulle's insistence had replaced the first EEC President, Walter Hallstein. In 1965, the EEC Commission employed about 3200 officials in 8 buildings (the move to the old „Berlaymont“ started in 1967). Today the Commission employs about 22.000 officials in 61 buildings. The 1960's brought strong economic growth to most Member States, in political terms however Europe did not grow stronger: an English accession had been vetoed by De Gaulle in 1963. And his “empty chair policy“ which meant that no Member State could be out-voted in matters of national interest, was still making itself felt, despite the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966. No further progress towards European integration could take place before De Gaulle's resignation in the wake of the unrest of May 1968 gave it a new impetus.
# 1.1. Our forerunner: the Food-aid Committee 1961-1967
With the first Yaoundé Association Conventions (1963-69) we saw the first hopeful dawning of a European development policy however, although development cooperation – due to the differing interests of Member States - kept heading up cul-de-sacs. From 1962-1970 the “development of overseas states and territories “ (then the name of what was later DG Development) was in the hands of Commissioner Henri Rochereau, followed in 1973 by Claude Cheysson. However, it was the Dutch Commissioner for Agriculture and later Commission President, Sicco Mansholt, who launched the initiative which led to the founding of our association.
In those days, the attention of people in Europe was drawn to happenings in the southern hemisphere mainly through famine reports; the FAO called for a campaign to combat such disasters. In Belgium the main supporter of such actions was OXFAM1. In contact with OXFAM the Association of Officials formed a committee, presided by Mansholt due to his connections with the FAO. From 1961 to 1967 this committee organised 6 fund-raising campaigns among EEC off
icials. The funds collected were not for direct food aid but were used for the improvement of agricultural production2
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A native of Dublin, I studied in University College, Dublin (B.Comm.), then in St Patrick's College Maynooth (H.Dip.in Ed), then back again to UCD (Dip. in Cat). Early work experience included 4 years teaching at secondary level and student jobs in accounting and as a multilingual travel guide.
After my marriage I spent some time in Denmark, returned to Ireland, then trained with the European Commission as an interpreter. I worked there for three years, then went freelance and also started translating.
After many years in Brussels, moved to Slovenia 7 years ago, and have never regretted the move.
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